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PARTNERSHIP REAL ESTATE
EFFECT OF THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT ON CONVEY-
ANCES TO THE FIRM IN THE FIRM NAME
DONALD CAMPBELL *
nHE PURPOSE of this article is to state the validity
-X-and effect of a conveyance of real estate to a partner-
ship in the firm name, as, for example, where the firm
name contains the surname of one or more partners in
connection with such customary additions as Blank Lum-
ber Co., Blank & Co., or Blank & Son, and where the firm
name is purely fictitious and is merely a trade identifica-
tion, such as The Ajax Co., Boulevard Flower Shop, or
American Laundry.
Whatever statements are true with respect to such con-
veyances to the firm might be expected to be true con-
versely with respect to conveyances by the firm in the
firm name, but it does not necessarily follow. The tenure
resulting from a conveyance to the firm may make a re-
conveyance impossible without all partners joining.
The writer had purposed to show the abrupt change
made by the courts from a line of decisions previously
based upon the common law brought about through the
adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act in those juris-
dictions where the act has been adopted. It was his in-
* Member of Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law; Pro-
fessor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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tention to discuss with particularity the provision under
section 8, paragraph 3 which provides, in effect, that title
to real estate may be taken in the firm name, and that
title so taken may be reconveyed only in the firm name.1
With respect to the purpose of the writer, it may well be
said that "the mountain labored and brought forth a
mouse," for but few pertinent cases can yet be discovered
in the reported decisions.
The barrenness of the reports as to decisions searched
for may well be explained. Since the act has been adopted
in only nineteen states, including Alaska,2 little or no
change can be expected in the other thirty jurisdictions.
Further, since the act was adopted nowhere earlier than
twenty years ago, and in two states less than five years
ago, we may expect but few cases involving this point to
have reached the courts of last resort. Still further, the
habits of partners, conveyancers, and attorneys, condi-
tioned by many years of the common-law practice may
cause such persons to hesitate to accept the validity of
acts and contracts made valid and secure only by force
of fairly recent statutes that are radical departures from
previouslyaccepteU hUeories. Onthe other hand, the full
purport and effect of the statute may have been recog-
nized, so that there has been little resort to litigation.
Before entering upon a discussion of cases, however few
in number, where the provisions of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act have been invoked, it might be well to review
1 "Partnership Property.-(l) All property originally brought into the
partnership stock or subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise, on
account of the partnership, is partnership property.
"(2) Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired with part-
nership funds is partnership property.
"(3) Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership name.
Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership name.
"(4) A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name, though with-
out words of inheritance, passes the entire estate of the grantor unless a con-
trary intent appears." U. L. A., Vol. 7, p. 16.
2 State and year of adoption: California, 1929; Colorado, 1931; Idaho,
1919; Illinois, 1917; Maryland, 1916; Massachusetts, 1922; Michigan, 1917;
Minnesota, 1921; Nevada, 1931; New Jersey, 1919; New York, 1919; Penn-
sylvania, 1915; South Dakota, 1923; Tennessee, 1917; Utah, 1921; Virginia,
1918; Wisconsin, 1915; Wyoming, 1917; Alaska, 1917.
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briefly the effect of conveyances to the firm in the firm
name in jurisdictions unaffected by the act, or in all juris-
dictions prior to the act.'
It was elemental at common law that title to real estate
could vest only in some person or persons, either natural
or artificial, identified by a particular name.4 As applied
to artificial persons the rule contemplated only corpora-
tions. Since a partnership was not a person, but a group
or aggregation of individuals operating or doing business
under some name not necessarily composed of any or all
the names of such persons, it therefore followed that
at common law it was impossible to convey legal title in
real estate to a partnership unless the deed described
each and every member by his proper name. Where, how-
ever, a deed failed to describe all the partners by their
names it was still a valid conveyance of legal title to
those partners whose names did appear as grantees. As
to such named grantees, title became vested in them as
tenants in common,5 subject to partnership equities. It is
not to be implied that a partnership even at common law
might not have beneficial interest in lands or have an
equitable interest in land held by a trustee for the benefit
of the members of the firm, but a partnership could not
take legal title to land by reason of a conveyance to it in
the firm name.
Transfers of personal property were never required
to measure up to the strictly observed formalities of
s See I A. L. R. 556. The case of Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Company
et al. v. A. W. Sewell et al., 249 F. 840 (1918), is made the subject of ex-
haustive footnotes and further annotation. Same ground is covered in 47
C. J. 756. Also well discussed under Deeds, 8 R. C. L. 935. See Mechernm,
Floyd R., Elements of Partnership (2d ed., Chicago: Callaghan and Co.,
1920), p. 133 et seq.
4 A common law exception is recognized in "dedications" to public, pious,
or religious uses. Village of Mankato v. Willard, 13 Minn. 1, 97 Am. Dec.
208 (1868). The validity of the dedication is approached and decided from
the viewpoint that a dedication to a public use operates as an estoppel which
precludes the original owner or those claiming under him from revoking
the dedication.
5 Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Company et al. v. A. W. Sewell et al., 249
F. 840, 1 A. L. R. 556 (1918) ; Percifull v. Platt, 36 Ark. 456 (1880).
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
transfers of real estate and such transfers in some juris-
dictions included mortgages of real estate or other inter-
ests in land so long as such interests were not, strictly
speaking, real property.8
The foregoing remarks as to the common law suffi-
ciently cover the situations described under the first class
of conveyances exemplified heretofore, and it may be said
upon abundant authority, in the absence of code or stat-
ute, that where a conveyance of real estate is made to
the firm name which contains a surname of one or more
or all of the partners, legal title passes to the person or
persons named as tenants in common subject to partner-
ship equities ;7 and that a conveyance to a partnership in
the firm name, where such name is purely fictitious,
passes no legal title-the person or persons, natural or
artificial, in whom title must vest, so necessary and vital
at common law, are wanting, and the deed is void. In the
latter case, legal title remains in the grantor, although
6 In Hendren v. Wing, 60 Ark. 561, 31 S. W. 149, 46 Am. St. Rep. 218
(1895), the court said in determining that a chattel mortgage to the
"Arkansas Machine & Supply Company" was valid and would sustain an
action in replevin, " 'A partnership, as such, cannot at law be the grantee
in a deed or hold real estate.' This rule does not apply to personal property.
On the contrary, a partnership, as such, can at law be the vendee in a bill
of sale or other conveyance of personal property. The custom of the country
teaches us that this is so."
To the same effect is Menage v. Burke, 43 Minn. 212, 45 N. W. 155(1890); Woodward v. McAdam, 101 Cal. 438, 35 P. 1016 (1894); New
Vienna Bank v. Johnson, 47 Ohio 306, 24 N. E. 503 (1890).
7 (a) Cole v. Mette, 65 Ark. 503, 47 S. W. 407, 67 Am. St. Rep. 945
(1898), (citing Percifull v. Platt, 36 Ark. 456) : Mette and Kanne were sur-
names of two partners and a conveyance to "Mette & Kanne" vested legal
title in both partners sufficient for them to maintain an action in ejectment:
(b) In Riddle v. Whitehill, 135 U. S. 621, 10 S. Ct. 924, 34 L. Ed. 282(1889), in a deed to "J. M. Whitehill & Co ... ," the legal title vested in
J. M. Whitehill impressed with a trust for the benefit of the partnership.
(c) Robinson v. Daughtry, 171 N. C. 200, 88 S. E. 252, Ann. Cas. 1918E
1186 (1916); a deed executed to R. P. Robinson & Co., was held legally
valid and vested equitable title in the members of the partnership as tenants
in common.
(d) In Arthur v. Weston, 22 Mo. 378 (1856), a deed to "W. W. Phelps
& Co.," a partnership of Phelps and others, passed legal title to Phelps only.
Parol evidence was inadmissable to explain further.
(e) See an early and leading case quoted by many later decisions in other
courts: Morse v. Carpenter, 19 Vt. 613 (1847).
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an equitable title passes, and the grantor is trustee for
the use of the firm.8
Exceptions to this view may naturally be expected in
the English cases,9 but it is rather curious and interesting
to note that at an early date Massachusetts decided that
a deed to an unincorporated association known and de-
scribed as "South Chelmsford Hall Association" passed
good legal title to the members as tenants in common.'0
The court, however, did not decide that title passed
because the Association was an entity capable of taking
title. Had the court so held, it would have adopted the
entity theory of partnership organization to a degree
that has never been acceptable to the courts of this coun-
8 (a) The question presented: Do deeds to Grante Pass Real Estate
Association vest in the partners composing that association any title, legal or
equitable, to the lands described in said deeds? "In other words, is a deed to
a partnership by its firm name void? . . . I have been unable to find an
adjudged case where it has been held that a partnership might take the title
to land in its firm name, when such firm name did not contain the surname
of one or more of the partners. . . . But . . . if the deeds . . . were ineffectual
as conveyances of the legal title to the firm, [still] they . . . created an
equitable estate in the land described." Kelly v. Bourne, 15 Ore. 476, 16 P.
40 (1887).
(b) Where a deed purported to convey title to "Spaulding Mfg. Co.,"
which was a partnership, the court held the deed to be void at law but not
in equity and permitted the deed to be corrected to show proper grantees.
Spaulding v. Gobold, 92 Ark. 63, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 282, 19 Ann. Cas. 947,
121 S. W. 1063 (1909).
(c) In Silverman v. Kristufek, 162 Ill. 222, 44 N. E. 430 (1896), a deed
to "Townsend Nenns & Co." conveyed nothing at law. Consistently followed
in The Decatur Coal Company et al. v. Ira W. Clokey, 332 Ill. 253, 163
N. E. 702 (1928).
(d) Title remains in grantor, but equitable title passes, held in Tidd v.
Rines, 26 Minn. 201, 2 N. W. 497 (1879) (deed to "Todd Gorton & Co."
conveyed no legal title) ; Africa et al. v. Trexler, 232 Pa. Sup. Ct. 493, 81
A. 707 (1911), citing 42 Pa. Super. Ct. 542, 547 (1910).
(e) As to effect of a deed to a truly fictitious person see Wiehl, Probasco
& Co. v. Robertson, 97 Tenn. 458, 37 S. W. 274, 39 L. R. A. 423 (1896)
and note.
9 Wray v. Wray, [1905] 2 Ch. 349 for an early example.
10 (a) Byam v. Bickford, 140 Mass. 31, 2 N. E. 687 (1885). The argu-
ment sustaining the decision goes to considerable length in inference.
(b) Walker v. Miller, 139 N. C. 448, 52 S. E. 125, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.)
157, 4 Ann. Cas. 601, 11 Am. St. Rep. 805 (1905). The firm name was
"Jas. Webb, Jr., & Bro." There was no living member whose name appeared
in the old firm name at the time the deed was executed. The court held
that a deed to the old firm name could be said to have passed legal title, or
at least since a perfect equitable title rested in the living members of the
firm, the plaintiffs could maintain an action at law based upon the sufficiency
of their title.
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try in the absence of statute. Massachusetts did not fol-
low the trend indicated in that case, but thereafter re-
mained in harmony with common law decisions.
Before reverting to the original purpose of this article
as already expressed, it seems of value to pursue further
the question of the legal entity of a partnership. The
American courts have consistently viewed the partner-
ship as an aggregation of individuals, although in other
countries, the legal entity or juristic person theory has
been acceptable. In America, as early as 1902, and until
1913, considerable discussion took place among law teach-
ers and authorities as to the possible codification of part-
nership law. In such codification, the possible benefit
to be derived from an acceptance of the legal entity
theory was warmly suggested and likewise repudiated.
In 1902 a conference of the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the Committee on Commercial Law of
the American Bar Association secured the services of
Dean Ames of the Law School of Harvard University, as
expert to draft the act. Dean Ames was succeeded by
Dr. William Draper Lewis, and in 1910 drafts of a part-
nership act were prepared and submitted both along the
line of the mercantile or entity theory, and also along the
line of the aggregate or common law theory. In all,
eight drafts were prepared and submitted, and final de-
cision as to the theory to be adopted was resolved in
favor of the common law or aggregate theory, subject to
the modification that partners be treated as owners of
partnership property holding by special tenure or ten-
ancy which was called tenancy in partnership. Further
amendments and refinements produced the Uniform Part-
nership Act as recommended for adoption to the legisla-
tures of all the states."
The straddle between the entity theory and the aggre-
gate theory resulted in the retention of the common law
11 Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 7, Partnership, p. 3, 4.
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except as to partnership property. Here, however, the
entity theory greatly modified or superceded the common
law rules, and undoubtedly the effects will not be capable
of appreciation until cases are presented to and decided
by the higher courts. So far the cases are few, but the
change is inescapable, and decisions will undoubtedly be
reported that may eventually point the way to further
adoption of the entity theory. 2
It is interesting to note that although the idea of the
partnership as a juristic person has been almost univer-
sally denied in the absence of code, yet it would not be
impossible to point out in almost every jurisdiction cases
where, at some time and for some purpose, the courts
have given a partnership that status. The Massachusetts
case of Byam v. Bickford1" has already been mentioned,
and but one further example will be cited. In Illinois, a
great rock of the common law, as early as 18671 and
again as late as 19221 the Supreme Court said, "A part-
nership is recognized as a legal entity distinct from and
independent of the persons composing it,-at least in
respect to property." Read without context, this isolated
statement would persuade one to think that Illinois be-
lieved in the juristic person, whereas in fact the contrary
is true. However, the case cited was in a criminal appeal,
wherein it had been charged and necessarily had to be
proved that the property stolen belonged to a partner-
12 The sections dealing with property and property rights where the most
fundamental changes were made are sections 8, 10, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28.
For fairly recent cases affected by the sections other than section 8 see
Rosen v. Rosen, 212 N. Y. S. 405 (1925); Wharf v. Wharf, 306 Ill. 79,
137 N. E. 446 (1922) ; Roder v. Goldoff et al., 228 N. Y. S. 453 (1928) ;
Savings & Loan Corporation v. Bear, 155 Va. 312, 154 S. E. 587, 75 A. L. R.
980 (1930) ; Charleston First Nat'l Bank v. White, 268 Ill. App. 414 (1932).
1a See footnote 10.
14 Jones v. Bliss, 45 Ill. 143 (1867). Bill to compel payment of book
accounts to his partner. The court said: "A partnership creates an artificial
entity, distinct from the members of the firm .. "
15 The People v. Zangain, 301 Ill. 299, 304 (1922). Theft of property
where proof of ownership by partnership was essential. The court said: "A
partnership is recognized as a legal entity distinct from and independent of
the persons composing it, or at least in respect to property."
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ship. Undoubtedly the prisoner was guilty, although
three judges dissented on the exact point presented, and
the statement was not dictum.
Paragraph 3 of section 8 of the Uniform Partnership
Act reads as follows: "Any estate in real property may
be acquired in the partnership name. Title so acquired
can be conveyed only in the partnership name." The
uniform act is partly declaratory of the common law and
partly an attempt to improve upon, make uniform, and
simplify certain aspects of the law of partnership in
which there was much discord among the several states.
As to partnership property it was the avowed intent of
the commissioners to change existing law.'0 Unless the
section under consideration conflicts with other stat-
utory provisions relating to deeds or conveyances, or
is unassimilable, there is no apparent reason why there
should be conflict. The Uniform Partnership Act has
made partnership property personalty, whether it be per-
sonal or real in fact, or real when held in other tenures.
Perhaps to be accurate and to follow the exact language
of the act, partnership property is held by tenancy in
erty. These provisions of the statute give a logical basis
for disregarding the common law decisions.' 7
The Supreme Court of Illinois in 1922 in the case of
Wharf v. Wharf,"' in considering the provisions of the
act for the first time said,
The act made material changes in the law of this state relat-
ing to partnerships. . . . It purports to be a complete code
declaring the law as to all these subjects and makes material
changes in the law of this state relating to partnership, but what-
ever its intrinsic merits or demerits, it represents the judgment
of the legislature as to the law of partnership. 19
16 Uniform Laws Ann., Vol. 7, U. P. A., p. 16 commissioners' note.
17 Sections 25, 26, U. P. A.
'8 306 Ill. 79, 137 N. E. 446 (1922).
19 The court continued, "Related in some way to the question here in-
volved, it [the act] contains the following provisions:
"In part 2, paragraph 3 of section 8 is as follows: (3) Any estate in real
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The Supreme Court then concluded for the first time, by
force of the statute, and contrary to previous holdings
at common law, that partnership property shall for all
purposes of partnership be considered personalty; that a
partner's interest in the partnership is his share of the
profits and surplus, which is personal property; that
partnership land shall not be subject to dower, curtesy,
and allowances to heirs; and that when dissolution is
caused by death, each partner as against his copartner
and all persons claiming through him in respect to their
interest in the partnership, unless otherwise agreed, may
have the partnership property applied to discharge its
liabilities and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net
amount owing to the respective partners. The latter is
inconsistent with the doctrine heretofore held that upon
the settlement of the partnership affairs real estate re-
sumes its original character and descends to heirs.
Litigation involving our own particular provisions
seems to have arisen in Minnesota more than in any other
state. In the case of Angell v. White Eagle Oil & Refining
Co. et al.," decided in 1926, the court held that a partner-
ship was not a legal entity, but further stated as dictum,
As respects the right to take and convey title to real property,
this doctrine has been modified in some respects by the Uniform
Partnership Act. See sections 6, 8, and 10 (sections 7389, 7391,
and 7393, G. S. 1923).
At a later date, in the case of Windom National Bank
et al. v. Klein et al.,2' the Supreme Court of Minnesota
property may be acquired in the partnership name. Title so acquired can be
conveyed only in the partnership name."
It was not necessary to cite this particular section of the statute in deter-
mining the issues in the case although, as the court said, the statutory pro-
vision was related in some way to the question involved. This is the nearest
approach in Illinois to a case involving paragraph 3 of section 8 as yet.
20 169 Minn. 183, 210 N. W. 1004 (1926). Angell and Ness were part-
ners engaged in performing a contract of employment with the oil company.
Angell died from injuries sustained in such employment, and his widow was
awarded compensation. The court said that since a partnership is not a legal
entity, the members could individually enter into contracts of employment.
21 191 Minn. 447, 254 N. W. 602 (1934).
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considered the attempted assignment of a partner's in-
terest in specific property and held it to be void. The
decision was based upon construction and application of
the Uniform Partnership Act, although the court stated
that the same conclusion had been reached on similar
facts in Iowa,2 2 without the aid of the statute.
The Minnesota court quoted freely from the Minnesota
act and, although only dictum, further stated,
Contrary to the common law rule, real property may be ac-
quired by the partnership and title taken and conveyed in the
"partnership name." Subject to the rules of section 10 (Mason's
Minn. St. 1927, §7393), a partnership now holds real estate under
the same conditions as to tenure and disposition as it does per-
sonal property.
Although the law as quoted was not necessary to the
decision in the case, still it does presage the future atti-
tude of the court when the question will be squarely pre-
sented. Decision and not dicta should be cited, but as to
section 8 paragraph 3, dicta is all that is to be found
as yet.
In the same case under consideration, as to application
and construction of the Uniform Partnership Act, the
court further said, "The law is not to be restricted so
as to perpetuate any of the incidents of partnership deal-
ings, or of the tenure and disposition of partnership prop-
erty, which it was the intention to abrogate or change."
One more Minnesota case, as recent as 1935, must be
considered. In Keegan v. Keegan,23 unfortunately for
our purpose, only as dicta, the court said,
At common law a partnership is not a person or an entity....
The common law as to partnerships has been markedly changed.
Although the Uniform Partnership Act does not make a partner-
ship an entity for all purposes, it does so treat it in certain
respects and for certain purposes. Under that Act (adopted in
22 Malvern National Bank v. Halliday, 195 Iowa 734, 192 N. W. 843
(1923).
23 194 Minn. 261, 260 N. W. 318 (1935). A proceeding under Workmen's
Compensation Act by a widow for death of husband who was a member of
the respondent partnership firm.
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Minnesota in 1921, Mason's Minn. St. 1927, §§7384-7428) a part-
nership may take title to real estate and convey it in the firm
name. Section 7393. This could not be done at common law.
The court in Wisconsin, as early as 1883,24 held that
legal title passed by a deed to "Gilmore & Ware," where
evidence was offered and admitted to show that Gilmore
and Ware were partners at the time of delivery of the
deed. The court's intimations were sustained in City
Bank of Portage v. Plank.2" The state passed the Uni-
form Partnership Act in 1915, but no case bearing upon
title to the firm in the firm name has been litigated since.
Through historical preference, as well as by inference
from the Supreme Court's statement in the case of Matt-
son v. Wagstad, 6 the Uniform Partnership Act will be
given complete effect as to any partnership problem
which falls within its provisions.
In an action by a lien-claiming materialman to be sub-
rogated to the rights of a vendee under a land contract,
the Supreme Court of Michigan said,
A partnership may buy and sell real estate. It may be conveyed
only by the partnership. The signatures of the wives are not
necessary for the conveyance thereof. Section 8, Act No. 72,
Public Acts 1917: section 7966 (8) (3) 1922 Supp. C. L. 1915.27
While the actual record title is not given in the opinion,
so that the question of "firm name" is not made clear,
the decision nevertheless quotes from the Michigan stat-
utes the provisions which would be parallel to section 8,
subsection 3, of the Uniform Partnership Act. The plain-
tiff lost the case, however, for failure to claim his lien
through procedure within statutory limitations.
. In South Dakota, the Uniform Partnership Act was
cited to hold void a chattel mortgage by two of four
24 Sherry v. Gilmore, 58 Wis. 324, 17 N. W. 252 (1883).
25 141 Wis. 653, 124 N. W. 1000 (1910).
26 188 Wis. 556, 206 N. W. 865 (1926). Action for an account by heirs
of deceased partner's interest against surviving partner. The U. P. A. is
cited to show that both real and personal property belonging to the firm
are partnership property: a partner's interest therein is personalty and the
property is not subject to allowances to widows, heirs, or next of kin.
27 Scheurman v. Farhman et al., 245 Mich. 688, 224 N. W. 604 (1929).
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partners, by which they attempted to convey an un-
divided one-half interest in growing crops which were
partnership property. The court stated that since the
real ownership and legal title to partnership property
was vested in the "firm," a sale or mortgage by less than
all of the partners in specific partnership property could
never pass title or create a lien on it; that the mortgagee
took nothing but surplus after settlement of partnership
business.2 8 The application of the decision to our particu-
lar provision is only potential and persuasive.
In Massachusetts, the firm entity theory and the vest-
ing of title to partnership property in the entity was
made the occasion for defeating a suit to recover dam-
ages to a truck owned by the partnership, but registered
in the name of one of the partners.2 9 The court referred
to the Uniform Partnership Act, sections 24 and 25, in ar-
riving at its decision. That case involved only personal
property, but although no Massachusetts decision has been
given involving real property since the Uniform Partner-
ship Act, annotators of the laws of Massachusetts note
that real estate is held as personalty for partnership pur-
.. a fl but ~n noUiI.~t necc-dJJ. SUOLL jpupoe it, 1le11
descends as real estate to the heirs.3 0 Since the Uniform
Partnership Act of Massachusetts is identical in the con-
trolling provisions with the act in Illinois, in which state
the view of the Massachusetts annotator is expressly
repudiated by a supreme court decision, 1 the statement
of the annotator is confusing or indicative of a conclusion
contrary to Illinois decisions. The writer finds no case in
28 Valley Springs Holding Corp. v. Carlson et al., 56 S. D. 163, 227 N. W.
841 (1929).
29 Kilduff et al. v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 247 Mass. 453, 142 N. E. 98
(1924). The court iccepted the clever contention of the defendant and said
that as the legal title to the truck was in the partnership, as a firm or
entity, the registration in the name of the individual partner was illegal, and
the truck was a trespasser on the highway; and recovery was denied.
30 Annotated Laws of Massachusetts (Lawyers Co-op. Pub. Co.), Vol. 3,
Ch. 108A, sec. 8. Partnership Property defined-annotation, p. 607.
31 Wharf v. Wharf, 306 Ill. 79, 137 N. E. 446 (1922).
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Massachusetts falling under section 8, subsection 3, since
the state adopted the act.
In New York, in In re Dumarest's Estate,2 the court
did not have occasion to consider our provision but did
cite the New York Partnership Law, section 51, subd.
2(a), 2(e), to sustain the statement that "a partner has
no personal right in any specific property of a partner-
ship of which he is a member.., and such property is not
subject to conjugal rights." Too strong an inference
should not be drawn from the case as to the application
of New York partnership law to facts concerning convey-
ance of title in the firm name. Long prior to the Uniform
Partnership Act, New York recognized "tenancy in part-
nership," and the courts had many times announced that
"a partner's interest in the partnership is his share of
the profits and surplus." That was true long before the
act was passed. 8
But our law has never adopted the civil law theory of the form
as a juristic entity; the Uniform Partnership Law as little as any
other. That statute recognizes the partners as co-owners (tenants
in partnership) of the "specific" firm property (section 51 N. Y.
Partnership Law) and while it is often said, and truly, that the
firm is treated at times as if it were an "entity," the doctrine
has never become considerable excuse for its adoption. Francis
v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 895, 35 S. Ct. 701, 57 L. Ed. 1029, L. R. A.
1915E 706.34
In view of the language quoted, the writer hesitates to
say that the New York courts will construe our particular
provision of the act as have the courts of Illinois, Minne-
sota and Michigan. No New York case directly in point
has been decided as yet.
In Savings & Loan Corporation v. Bear,35 the court
had for decision the question of priority of liens against
individual and partnership property. The court barely
32 262 N. Y. S. 450 (1933).
33 Rossmore v. Commissioners of Internal Revenue, 76 F. (2d) 520
(1935).
34 Ibid.
35 155 Va. 312, 154 S. E. 587, 75 A. L. R. 980 (1930).
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suggests by a phrase that, in Virginia, real estate could
be conveyed to the firm in the firm name, but said nothing
further. It might be added, though, that the court was
considering liens and priority under the uniform act.
Although Iowa is considered a "code" state, and has
statutory provisions concerning partnership, whereby the
firm may be sued as an entity, the courts still repudiate
the entity in so far as taking title to real estate is con-
cerned. This view is clearly set forth in a recent case of
Bankers Trust Co. v. Knee, Sheriff et al.86
As a conclusion, although based for the most part upon
cases wherein our particular section was not put directly
in issue, and although based upon a review of apparently
but few cases (because but few have been decided since
the Uniform Partnership Act became law), it seems safe
to say under the provisions of the Uniform Partnership
Act section 8, subsection 3, and only by authority of the
statute, and in derogation of common law, that a convey-
ance of real property to a partnership in the firm name
(whether fictitious or otherwise) vests legal title in the
firm, and for that purpose at least, the partnership has
the status of a legal entity or juristic personality.
36 263 N. W. 549 (Iowa, 1935).
